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1.  Introduction 
Taxes on labor income and consumption expenditures encourage households to substitute 
away from the legal market sector in favor of untaxed activities – leisure, household 
production, and the shadow economy. We investigate these substitution responses by relating 
measures of employment, market work hours, shadow economy size, and the industry mix of 
market production activity to tax rate differences among rich countries.  
Our objective is to assess the long run total response of these outcomes to persistent 
differences in tax rates on labor income, payrolls and consumption – collectively, personal 
taxes. By “total response,” we mean the direct effects that work through labor supply and 
demand plus indirect effects that involve government spending responses to available tax 
revenues. As in Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Krusell et al. (1996), Persson and Tabellini 
(2002) and Becker and Mulligan (2003), we recognize that taxing capacity affects government 
expenditures. In turn, many expenditure programs affect labor supply incentives. Leading 
examples include government programs for unemployment and disability insurance. 
Our sample of rich countries offers a modest number of data points. Despite this 
limitation, the broad-brush comparisons that we undertake are useful for several reasons. 
First, a focus on national outcomes provides information about the combined effect of taxes 
working through labor supply and labor demand channels. In this regard, we stress that tax 
effects on hours worked and other outcomes cannot be inferred from labor supply elasticities 
alone. Our theory of task assignment implies that personal taxes have disproportionately large 
effects on the demand for less skilled workers. By most accounts, labor supply is also more 
elastic for less skilled workers. So, as personal taxes twist labor demand away from less 
skilled workers, their negative effects on work hours and employment are amplified. 
Second, countries with high tax rates on labor and consumption have relatively generous 
tax-funded programs for social security, disability insurance, sick leave assistance, 2  
unemployment insurance and general assistance. The benefit sides of these programs alter 
labor supply incentives in ways that discourage market work activity, increase employment in 
the underground economy and alter the industry mix of market production activity. Insofar as 
government spending on these programs responds to the availability of tax revenues, the full 
response to differences in taxing capacity includes the indirect effects that work through the 
expenditure side of government behavior. Conceivably, the indirect expenditure effects on the 
outcome variables under study are larger than the direct effects of taxes.1  
Third, there are large, highly persistent differences among countries in tax rates on labor 
and consumption and in the scale of tax-funded social insurance programs. This variation 
partly compensates for a modest number of data points. Moreover, labor market responses to 
persistent tax rate changes are probably bigger over the longer term, as imperfectly mobile 
factors of production migrate between sectors and activities in the wake of tax changes, and as 
slow-working welfare-state dynamics come into play. The persistent character of national 
differences in personal tax rates makes them well suited for assessing long run effects. 
These remarks suggest that national comparisons help to inform our thinking about the 
effects of taxes and taxing capacity. The evidence provides useful inputs for assessing the 
performance of economic theory and the success or failure of public policy, tax policy in 
particular. In this regard, Prescott (2002, 2003) argues that French welfare would rise by 19 
percent in consumption-equivalent terms, if France lowered its labor and consumption taxes 
to U.S. levels. He bases this assessment on the cross-country empirical relationship among 
taxes, factor inputs and output per working-age person, as interpreted through the lens of a 
                                                 
1 We make no effort to summarize the vast body of research on the labor supply incentives associated with social 
insurance programs, but studies of the Swedish case by Aronson and Walker (1997) and Henrekson and Persson 
(2004) highlight many of the issues.  Krueger and Meyer (2002) review much of the relevant literature.  3  
standard one-sector growth model. If Prescott’s assessment is correct, France and many other 
nations bear enormous costs for high tax rates on labor and consumption.2  
In terms of Prescott’s framework and analysis, our study is useful for two reasons. First, 
the view that France’s relatively high tax rates cause its relatively low output per working-age 
person suggests other hypotheses that we address. Evidence on these hypotheses serves to 
support, qualify or undermine Prescott’s conclusion. Second, more detailed evidence about 
whether and how personal taxes affect work time and productive activity provides inputs for 
improved model-building and more refined policy analysis.  
Before proceeding, it will be useful to spell out some conventions regarding terminology.  
For our purposes, “market production” refers to output produced and incomes generated in 
legal markets, and which are declared to the government and captured in the National Income 
and Product Accounts. The “shadow” or “underground” economy refers to the output and 
incomes generated in markets, but which are not declared to the government, particularly the 
taxing authorities. “Household production” refers to output produced for own consumption, as 
distinct from output produced and sold in formal or informal markets. “Leisure” refers to the 
time devoted to rest and intrinsically enjoyable activities that are otherwise non-productive. In 
line with this terminology, we think of household time as allocated among market production, 
underground production, household production and leisure.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the household and 
underground production sectors and additional motivation for our focus on long run effects. 
Section 3 sketches a theory of task assignment and time allocation between market and non-
market production sectors. The theory identifies characteristics of production technologies 
and factor inputs that lead to high or low tax responsiveness. Since these characteristics differ 
                                                 
2 Prescott’s assessment is by no means universally shared among professional economists. Lindert (2002), for 
one, advances a much more favorable assessment of economic policy and performance in developed economies 
with high taxes and social spending. Blanchard (2004) offers a more mixed assessment that acknowledges some 4  
markedly across industries, the theory yields testable implications for the cross-country 
relationship between personal taxes and industry shares of employment and value added. 
Section 4 describes conditions whereby OLS regressions yield unbiased estimates for the total 
response to tax rate differences among countries. Section 5 describes the data in our sample of 
rich countries, and Section 6 reports evidence on the cross-country relationship of personal 
tax rates to the outcome measures.  Section 7 reviews other evidence that speaks to the long 
run total response to personal taxes, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Household Production, Underground Activity and Welfare-State 
Dynamics 
Taxes on labor and consumption lead to tax avoidance and tax evasion on several margins. 
The tax-induced substitution of household production and leisure for market goods and 
services are legal forms of tax avoidance. The tax-induced substitution of underground work 
activity for employment in the legal market sector, and the consumption of goods and services 
produced in the underground economy to escape taxation, are illegal forms of tax evasion. 
The size of the household and underground sectors suggests the potential for a significant tax-
induced diversion of productive activity away from the legal market sector.  
Eisner (1988, Table S.4) reports several estimates for the value of labor services supplied 
to the household production sector in the United States, ranging from 24 to 48 percent of 
official GNP.  Juster and Stafford (1991) report that time devoted to household production by 
a typical U.S. married couple is about three-quarters as large as hours worked for paid 
compensation.  Greenwood et al. (1995) cite this evidence as motivation for business cycle 
models with home production in their review of work on the topic. As their survey attests, 
                                                                                                                                                         
negative effects of high tax rates in Europe but places greater emphasis on regulations in product, labor and 
financial markets. 5  
macroeconomics has increasingly recognized the significance of the home production sector. 
Nevertheless, few analyses treat both home production and taxation.3        
Much economic analysis of taxation also neglects the underground sector. However, 
available evidence indicates that the shadow economy is sizable, even in developed 
economies, and that taxes are a major stimulant to underground activity. In their survey of 
research on the shadow economy, Schneider and Enste (2000, Table 7) report that the value of 
shadow economy output in the mid 1990s amounts to 16 percent of official GDP in the 
average OECD country, ranging from about 7 percent in Austria and Switzerland to 22 
percent or more in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.4 According to Giles and Tedds 
(2002, page 66), “there is a consensus that in almost every country that has been studied the 
underground economy has been growing relative to GDP or GNP over the past two or three 
decades.” 
The importance of taxation is well established in previous research on the determinants of 
shadow economy size. In the words of Giles and Tedds (2002, page 7), “Perhaps the single 
most commonly cited ‘driving force’ of the underground economy is the actual, or perceived, 
tax burden.”  Likewise, Schneider (2000, page 82) writes that “In almost all studies, one of 
the most important causes of the increase of the shadow economy is the rise of the social 
security and tax burden.” These research summaries strongly suggest that the impact of taxes 
                                                 
3 Boskin (1975) provides an early analysis of tax incidence and efficiency in a two-sector general equilibrium 
model with market and home production. Sandmo (1990), Piggott and Whalley (1998) and Kleven et al. (2000) 
analyze optimal taxation in models with home production. McGrattan et al. (1997) estimate an equilibrium 
business cycle model with home production and use it to evaluate the effects of distortionary taxation. Tax 
effects on the choice between market and household production activity play a central role in Rosen’s (1997) 
assessment of the Swedish welfare state and in Sørensen’s (1997) analysis of European unemployment. 
Olovsson (2004) considers the impact of personal taxes on market work activity in a dynamic equilibrium model 
with household production.   
4 Schneider and Enste report estimates of shadow economy size based on several different methods and types of 
data. Two methods that have been applied to many countries — the Physical Input (Electricity) Method and the 
Currency Demand Method — yield similar values for the average size of the shadow economy in the OECD and 
a similar pattern across countries. See their Tables 6 and 7.   6  
on underground economic activity is an important part of the overall response to personal tax 
rate differences among countries.5 
The foregoing remarks highlight the potential importance of tax-induced substitution 
away from production in the legal market sector to household and underground production 
activity. A distinct body of research on welfare-state dynamics highlights the potential for 
such tax-induced substitution responses to cumulate over time, leading to much bigger tax 
effects in the long run than the short run. 
  Lindbeck (1995) discusses several reasons for delayed private responses to the economic 
disincentives created by high tax rates and generous social insurance programs. He argues that 
habits, attitudes and social norms restrain the influence of economic incentives on behavior, 
and that these restraining influences can erode over time as a consequence of high tax rates 
and generous welfare-state benefits. In this vein, Lindbeck et al. (1999) model the interplay 
between individual incentives and a social norm favoring work over welfare. The intensity of 
the norm, as felt by the individual, diminishes with the population share of welfare recipients. 
This interaction gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria and extended dynamics.   
  Purely economic mechanisms can have similar effects. For example, Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (1995, section 4.3) model the effects of a breakdown in the monitoring process that 
deters abuse of the unemployment insurance system. In their analysis, an exogenous increase 
in unemployment leads to less effective monitoring of benefit claimants, which in turn allows 
for greater abuse. A sufficiently bad unemployment shock overwhelms the monitoring 
process and leads to a permanently higher rate of unemployment. Much other research on 
European unemployment stresses the potential for long and complex dynamic responses to 
                                                 
5 Johnson et al. (1998) argue that the administrative burden of taxation and the scope for corruption and abuse 
by the tax authorities, as distinct from tax rates, are key determinants of shadow economy size. We do not 
dispute this assessment for the sample of countries considered by Johnson et al., but the problems that they 
emphasize are much less important and probably much less variable among the countries in our sample. 7  
shocks or to changes in unemployment insurance and other labor market institutions. 
Prominent examples include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Blanchard (2000).  
  In the empirical work below, we examine data on tax measures and outcome variables as 
of the middle 1990s. Broadly speaking, pronounced cross-country differences in tax burdens 
and social safety nets had been in place for two decades or more by the mid 1990s – 
presumably long enough for any slow-working effects of taxation to have emerged.6 
Moreover, the countries in our sample were hit by large negative shocks in the 1970s and 
early 1980s of the sort that could be expected to expose any latent instability or negative 
feedback loops that amplify long run effects.  In this respect, a focus on outcomes in the mid 
1990s is well suited to our main objective.    
 
3.  Theory and Empirical Implications 
A. How Personal Taxes Affect Time Allocation and the Choice of Production Sector 
Consider a household that chooses between market and non-market solutions for 
accomplishing a certain task such as painting its home exterior. Under the market solution, the 
household hires a professional, and the transaction is subject to various taxes. Under the non-
market solution, the household applies its own time to accomplish the task and avoids 
taxation. A third alternative is to hire someone under the table, thereby evading some or all 
taxes without incurring the time cost of a do-it-yourself approach. The analysis below focuses 
on the first two options, but a similar analysis could be applied to any choice between taxed 
and untaxed (or less taxed) alternatives. 
How do personal taxes affect the choice between market and household modes of 
production? To address this question, assume initially that labor is the only input used to 
perform the task. For convenience, refer to the household making the choice of production 8  
mode as the “buyer”.  Assume that the good or service in question is produced and consumed 
in a given quantity, and define the following notation:  
H C = do-it-yourself cost in household production. 
M C  = cost of buying the service in the market from a professional supplier. 
B W  = buyer's pre-tax wage per unit of time.  
P W = pre-tax wage of the professional supplier. 
B H  = time required to accomplish the task by the buyer. 
P H  = time required to accomplish the task by the professional. 
t = marginal tax rate on the buyer’s labor income, including his or her 
mandatory contributions to social insurance funds. 
s = payroll tax rate levied on employers (i.e., the buyer). 
m = valued-added tax (VAT) rate or sales tax rate. 
 
Note that ( /
BP HH ) measures the professional’s relative productivity at the task in 
question. When  ,
BP HH >  the professional is more productive, and we may say that the 
professional has an absolute advantage in the activity. This case is likely to prevail in most 
circumstances, but the buyer could enjoy an absolute advantage in certain cases. For example, 
the buyer might be highly able in many tasks, not just in her market specialty.7  
The cost of production in the do-it-yourself case equals foregone after-tax wages: 
  (1 )
BB
H CW t H =− (1) 
That is, the time cost of self supply amounts to  (1 )
B Wt H −  in foregone expenditures on other 
consumption goods. The cost of buying the service in a competitive market is  
  (1 )(1 )
P P
M CW s m H =+ +  (2) 















                                                                                                                                                          
6 However, there is a broad upward drift in personal tax rates during the decades that precede our sample period, 
as we show in Section 6.  
7 In addition, many households have strong preferences for the self-supplied version in activities such as meal 
preparation and child care. And household production can yield utility directly, as in gardening for enjoyment. If 
would not be hard to incorporate these considerations into the analysis. 9  
Equation (3) says that the market solution dominates when the professional's comparative 
advantage – his relative productivity times the buyer’s relative wage – exceeds the tax factor, 
) 1 (











determines task assignment and time allocation. Taxes alter private choices regarding time 
allocation and task assignment by changing the threshold comparative advantage ratio at 
which the market solution dominates. 
Absent taxes, the privately optimal choice assigns the task to the person with comparative 
advantage. To see this point, observe that the right side of (3) equals one when s = m = t = 0.  
Observe, also, that the no-tax task assignment minimizes the opportunity value of the scarce 
time resources used up in accomplishing the task. In this sense, privately optimal task 
assignments are socially efficient in the absence of taxes. 
In contrast, by raising the minimum comparative advantage required of the professional 
for the market solution to obtain, personal taxes drive a wedge between privately and socially 
optimal task assignments. Too few tasks are carried out in the market sector because of taxes, 
and too little time is spent working in the market. Conversely, too many tasks are carried out 
in the household (or underground) sector, and too much time is spent working outside the 
legal market sector. As taxes rise, marginal producers in the market sector are displaced by 
less efficient producers in the household sector, which raises the average cost of overall 
production while lowering average production costs in the market sector.8  
Davis and Henrekson (2002) derive a version of (3) as a property of competitive 
equilibrium in a model with a continuum of consumption goods and households that allocate 
time among market production, household production and leisure. In their model, the market 
sector combines capital and multiple labor inputs to produce goods according to production 10  
technologies that exhibit constant returns to scale and smooth substitution among inputs. 
Households differ with respect to market wages, efficiency of home production technologies, 
and preferences over consumption goods. Thus, although we derived (3) in a very simple 
setting, it holds more generally. The key requirement underlying a condition like (3) is that 
the household be on the margin between working for paid compensation in the market and 
spending time at household production in some activity. Almost every working household is 
likely to satisfy this condition, especially in the long run when the household can exercise 
choice over market work hours.   
B. Choice of Production Sector with Capital Inputs 
It is straightforward to extend (3) to the case where production uses capital and labor in 
fixed proportions. Let K denote the amount of capital applied during production, and let
K P be 
the price per unit of capital. The rental rate on capital equals the sum of the interest rate, r, 
and the geometric rate of depreciation per unit time,  . δ 9  The costs of the market and non-
market solutions become 
  (1 ) ( )(1 ) ,   and
BB K B
H CW t H r t K P H δ =−+ + −  (4) 
 (1 )(1 )     ( )(1 ) ,
P PK P
M CW s m H r t K P H δ =+ + + + −  (5) 
where we assume that capital and labor income are taxed at the same rate, and that capital 
goods are not subject to a VAT or sales tax. The buyer now prefers the market solution when 
  ()
() ( 1 ) ( 1 )





WH r K P s m
HH
WH H W t
δ  ++ +
+− >  − 
   (6) 
The second term on the left side of (6) is positive so long as the professional has an 
absolute advantage in the task.  In this case, higher capital costs push the buyer toward the 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 Palda (1998) shows that taxes also lower productive efficiency and raise average costs when firms (or 
alternative market technologies) differ in the ability to evade taxes. In Palda’s model, unlike the model sketched 
here, taxes can raise average production costs in the legal market sector.   
9 Depreciation that is proportional to production adds equal amounts to the cost of the market and non-market 
solutions. Hence, such depreciation drops out of the decision rule, and we can ignore it. The same point applies 
to market-supplied intermediate inputs that are used up in production.    11  
market solution. For given capital intensity, the impact of capital costs on the choice of 
production mode intensifies with the professional’s absolute advantage. When the buyer and 
professional are equally productive in the task, the capital cost effect on the choice of 
production mode vanishes, and the decision rule reduces to (3). 
The professional’s absolute advantage favors the market solution because a do-it-yourself 
approach engages capital inputs for a longer time spell, raising capital rental costs in 
household production relative to market production. This logic clearly extends beyond capital 
inputs. In particular, whenever the buyer’s absolute disadvantage means that household 
production ties up cooperating factors for a longer time spell, the buyer is pushed toward the 
market solution. The cooperating factors of production could be capital inputs, but they could 
also be other workers required to accomplish the task. For this reason, the allocation of time 
to household production is relatively unattractive for activities that rely on team production 
methods that require the simultaneous application of multiple labor inputs.  
Equation (6) implicitly rests on frictionless rental markets for capital or, equivalently, on 
an assumption that the idle time of capital goods is the same whether deployed in the 
household or market production sectors. In fact, rental markets for capital goods are not 
frictionless, and the idle time of capital inputs is often much greater in the household sector. 
In terms of the home painting example, a professional might make use of a spray painter on a 
weekly basis, whereas the same piece of equipment might sit idle nearly year round when 
acquired for household production. 
As a polar alternative to the frictionless case, consider the situation with no rental or 
resale market for the capital input in question. Suppose that the professional supplier fully 
utilizes capital inputs in the market sector, and let γ  be a parameter that reflects the time 
interval between uses of the capital input in the household production sector. For example, if 12  
the time unit is one week, and a do-it-yourself handyman in the household sector makes use of 
a spray painter once every two years, then  104. γ =  
With no capital rental market, the decision rule governing choice of production mode has 
the same form as before, but nowγ  replaces 
B H  in the second term on the left side of (6). 
The strength of the capital cost effect now depends on the idle time of the capital input rather 
than the buyer’s absolute disadvantage. This idleness effect can be quite powerful for capital-
intensive tasks. Returning to the example of the spray painter, suppose that 
P H equals one 
week, 
B H equals two weeks and the household wants its home exterior painted once every 
two years. Then the capital cost component is twice as large in household production as in 
market production for the case of a frictionless rental market, but it is 104 times as large for 
the case of no capital rental market. 
In practice, the capital-cost differential between household and market production 
typically lies between these two polar alternatives. Idleness will be low for frequently used 
capital inputs such as cooking equipment, and for equipment with well-established rental 
markets such as light trucks for transporting household goods. In contrast, the prospect of 
high idleness and the absence of rental markets for, say, specialized wood-cutting equipment 
will discourage the assignment of certain carpentry tasks to the household sector, even when 
the professional does not have a large comparative or absolute advantage. 
The basic character of the decision rules (3) and (6) will be familiar to readers who are 
versed in the literature on assignment models. See Sattinger (1993) for an excellent synthesis 
of work in this area, and Davis (1997) for a simple model of assignment based on absolute 
advantage in a setting with team production. The central ideas in the assignment literature 
appear to have little explicit application to questions about the effects of taxation, although the 
concept of comparative advantage is widely appreciated.  
 13  
C. Empirical Implications   
The theory has interesting implications for which productive activities are most 
responsive to personal tax rates, i.e., most easily shifted from market to household or 
underground production modes. In this regard, the theory says that greater comparative and 
absolute advantage on the part of professional suppliers, greater capital intensity in 
production, and a higher degree of capital idleness in the household sector act as deterrents to 
tax-induced substitution away from market production modes. A greater efficiency advantage 
for team production also discourages substitution away from the market sector.   
The comparative and absolute advantage of professionals is greater when the market 
production mode relies intensively on highly skilled and highly specialized labor inputs. 
Hence, the theory predicts that employment and value added in skill-intensive industries are 
relatively insensitive to personal tax rates. If we interpret firm and establishment size as 
proxies for the importance of team production methods, then the theory predicts that 
employment and value added are relatively insensitive to personal tax rates in industries 
where large firms and establishments predominate. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, personal services, domestic household 
services, cleaning and laundry services, and eating and drinking establishments closely fit the 
profile of tax-responsive industries. Unfortunately, the measurement and classification of 
these production activities is well harmonized across countries only for eating and drinking. 
In light of this fact, the empirical investigation below considers employment and value added 
shares in eating and drinking establishments but not in personal services, domestic household 
services or cleaning and laundry services.    
The empirical work also considers value added and employment shares in lodging and 
retail trade. Lodging is capital intensive, but three aspects of its production technology point 14  
to easy substitution away from the legal market sector.10 First, the production of lodging 
services relies intensively on less skilled labor, so that comparative and absolute advantages 
do not strongly deter non-market production modes. Second, scale economies and team 
production methods are of modest importance, as evidenced by the many small establishments 
that provide lodging. Third, many households have underutilized living space, so that lodging 
services supplied outside the formal market sector do not involve large capital rental costs. 
So, despite the capital-intensive nature of lodging, neither absolute advantage nor idleness 
strongly deters tax-induced substitution out of the legal market sector.  
Retail trade also exhibits some characteristics that, according to the theory, facilitate tax-
induced substitution away from market production. As in lodging, the retail sector relies 
heavily on less skilled labor, and small establishments are commonplace. These attributes lead 
to high tax responsiveness. Working in the other direction, the retail sector is capital intensive, 
principally in the form of structures and inventories. On balance then, the theoretical 
presumption for high tax sensitivity in the retail sector is weaker than for the other sectors 
mentioned above. 
Another factor might play an important role in the tax responsiveness of the retail sector.  
Measured production in retail trade bundles the outputs of production processes that involve 
very different factor intensities. The inventory services produced by the sector are highly 
capital intensive, whereas the customer services are intensive in less skilled labor. Hence, 
even though the overall output bundle produced by retail trade is fairly capital intensive, the 
scope for tax-induced responses in the customer service component of retail output is 
probably large. If so, the tax-responsiveness of employment and value-added shares in the 
retail sector will be high, despite relatively high capital costs in the sector. Admittedly, a 
                                                 
10 As a practical matter, the data on lodging are aggregated with eating and drinking establishments for many of 
the countries in our sample. 15  
similar point could be made about other sectors, so our decision to single out retail trade in 
this respect involves some judgment. 
Our empirical investigation omits child care and elderly care from the analysis, even 
though these activities exhibit the characteristics identified by the theory as conducive to high 
tax sensitivity. Perhaps partly for this reason, rich countries with high tax rates tend to provide 
large direct or indirect subsidies for market (or state) provision of child and elderly care 
services. Rosen (1997) provides a detailed and provocative analysis of U.S.-Swedish 
differences in this regard, and Rogerson (2003) argues that this observation helps to explain 
high Scandinavian employment rates in the face of generally high tax rates. We do not seek to 
identify tax effects on choice of production mode for these activities, because we lack suitable 
and internationally comparable data on the effective tax rates applied to these activities and on 
market-based employment and value added in these activities. 
Our last point about the theory pertains to the impact of personal taxes on relative labor 
demand and the interaction with heterogeneity in labor supply elasticity. In particular, the 
theory implies that personal taxes alter the composition of labor demand in ways that amplify 
negative effects on hours worked and employment. To see this point, recall that greater skill 
intensity in production implies less scope for tax-induced substitution away from the market 
sector. Team production technologies work in the same direction, and it is well established 
that skill intensity rises with employer size.11 These theoretical effects mean that personal 
taxes reduce the relative demand of less skilled labor. By and large, empirical studies find that 
labor supply is more elastic for less skilled workers. In short, personal taxes reduce the 
relative demand of less skilled workers, and market work activity by less skilled workers is 
more responsive to labor demand shifts. So the tax-induced shift in the composition of labor 
demand magnifies the negative effects on employment and hours worked. 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Troske (1999) and the discussion on pages 33-36 in Brown et al. (1990). 16  
4.  Identification  
The empirical investigation considers regression equations of the form 
  CC C Ha b Tv = ++  (7) 
where C indexes countries, T is a monotonic function of the tax factor, and H is the average 
number of hours worked per adult or other outcome variable. Recall that our objective is to 
estimate the total response to tax rate differences among countries, inclusive of follow-on 
responses that involve government spending behavior. 
Our approach to identification relies on the assumption that personal tax rates differ 
among countries for reasons that are exogenous to the outcome variables. Given this 
assumption, there remain at least two important issues of identification. First, the total 
response to personal tax rate differences among countries can depend on the reason for the tax 
rate differences. Second, personal tax rates are measured with error. We concentrate here on 
the first issue. 
With respect to the reasons for cross-country variation in personal tax rates, it is helpful to 
distinguish among three categories: 
•  Taxing Capacity: Exogenous differences in taxing capacity and the efficiency of tax 
collection. Such differences can arise from constitutional provisions that affect taxing 
power, the degree of competition among autonomous tax authorities within the 
country, accidents of history when there is inertia in the political process that 
determines tax rates, and other causes. 
•  Welfare State Preferences: Exogenous differences in the desire or political support for 
social welfare programs that distort labor supply decisions and perhaps alter the 
structure of labor demand. These differences can arise from constitutional provisions 
that affect the political feasibility of redistributive tax and transfer programs, the 17  
degree of ethnic, linguistic and racial fragmentation of the population, accidents of 
history, and other causes.12 
•  Revenue Requirements: Exogenous differences in net government revenues from non-
distortionary (or less distortionary) sources. As examples, at any given level of 
welfare-state spending, higher revenues from petroleum export taxes or lower 
spending on national defense means less need to rely on distortionary forms of 
taxation.  
In line with this three-way categorization, consider a simple structural model for the 
outcome variable H, the tax variable, welfare state spending and net revenue requirements:  
 
H HH H
CC C C HT W u αβ γ =+ + +  (8) 
 
WW W W
CC C C WT G u αβ θ =+ + +  (9) 
 
TT T T
CC C C TW G u αγ θ =+ + +  (10) 
where W  is the welfare spending variable, G is an exogenous determinant of the 
government’s net revenue requirements, and  ,
H u
W u  and 
T u  are random disturbances that are 
uncorrelated with each other and with T, W and G.  Equation (8) describes the structural 
dependence of the outcome variable H on the tax and distortionary spending variables. 
Equations (9) and (10) describe the joint determination of taxation and distortionary spending. 
The total response of hours worked to an exogenous tax rate difference is given by 
  ,










where the  T ∆  notation signifies that the variation originates with an exogenous difference in 
taxes. According to (11), the hours worked response to an exogenous tax difference is the sum 
                                                 
12 Alesina et al. (2001) argue that greater ethnic, linguistic and racial fragmentation leads to less political support 
for social insurance and redistribution. The model of Persson et al. (2001) implies that a presidential-
congressional regime entails greater separation of powers than a parliamentary regime and, as a result, leads to 
smaller government and less redistribution in political equilibrium. Persson and Tabellini (2002) discuss theory 
and evidence related to the impact of political regimes and electoral rules on the size and composition of 
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of a direct effect and an indirect effect that works through government expenditures. The 
magnitude of the indirect effect rises with the impact of welfare spending on hours worked 
()
H γ  and the sensitivity of welfare spending to personal tax rates ( ).
W β   
To obtain the total response of hours worked to tax rate differences that originate with 
exogenous variation in welfare spending, compute the total derivative of (8) with respect to W 











=+  (12) 
Similarly, the total response of hours worked to tax rate differences that originate with 











=+  (13) 
 
Comparing (11), (12) and (13), we see that the total response to tax rate differences 
among countries is the same, irrespective of the reasons for the differences, when 
1/ / .
WT W T β γθ θ ==  This condition says that welfare spending varies with personal tax rates 
in the same manner regardless of the source of tax rate variation across countries. We refer to 
this condition as the equal spending-response condition.  
We are now in a position to clarify the interpretation of regressions (7) estimated on 
cross-country data. Suppose that the data are measured without error and that the structure 
(8)-(10) describes the data-generating process. If the equal spending-response condition holds, 
then OLS regression on (7) provides an unbiased estimate of the total response to tax rate 
differences across countries. In this context, “welfare state spending” should be interpreted 
broadly to mean any aspect of government behavior that varies systematically with personal 
tax rates and that has a direct effect on the outcome variable. 19  
The equal spending-response condition strikes us as a reasonable basis for interpreting 
OLS regressions on (7), but it is hardly an unassailable identifying assumption. When the 
equal spending-response condition fails, then OLS on (7) yields a weighted average of the 
total response expressions in (11), (12) and (13). The precise weights depend on the relative 
importance of the underlying sources of tax rate variation. OLS still yields an unbiased 
estimate of the average total response to personal tax rates and, for this reason, still provides 
useful information about long run tax effects on market work activity, shadow economy size 
and the industry mix of market activity.  
Recent research on the constitutional and political determinants of government spending 
suggests why the equal spending-response condition might fail. Several models of political 
equilibrium imply that proportional elections (large voting districts) lead to more government 
spending and higher taxes (Persson and Tabellini, 2002). The model of Persson et al. (2000) 
implies that parliamentary regimes also lead to more spending and higher taxes than 
presidential regimes. Persson and Tabellini (2002) find empirical support for both 
propositions, but they also find weaker evidence that these two dimensions of constitutional 
design differ in their implications for the share of government spending devoted to welfare-
state programs. Taken at face value, this empirical evidence means that the equal spending-
response condition fails in a sample of countries that differ with respect to both electoral rules 
and the choice between parliamentary and presidential regimes.  As this discussion also 
indicates, the identification issue is not resolved simply by finding an instrument for 
exogenous variation in tax rates across countries. Instruments that isolate different sources of 
tax rate variation can yield different total response estimates. 
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5.  The Country-Level Data 
Our empirical investigation considers data for nineteen countries on several outcome 
variables: the ratio of employment to population of working age (15-64 years), annual hours 
worked per employed person, annual hours worked per adult of working age, size of the 
shadow economy relative to measured GDP, and value added and employment shares for 
selected industry groups. Except for shadow economy size, our outcome measures are drawn 
mainly from OECD sources. In turn, the OECD data derive from national sources that are not 
fully harmonized in the measurement of employment, hours worked and value added.      
Internationally comparable data on employment and value added shares in the industries 
that we identified in Section 3 are not available for many countries. For this reason, our 
industry share comparisons involve smaller samples. By and large, more aggregated industry 
categories allow for larger samples and greater consistency among countries in the 
classification of production activities. We found reasonably consistent data for nine countries 
in Retail Trade and Repair Services, fourteen countries in Eating, Drinking and Lodging, and 
fourteen countries in a broader category that encompasses Trade, Repair Services, Eating, 
Drinking and Lodging. Wholesale trade activities plus vehicle trade and repair services are 
included in the broader category but excluded from Retail Trade and Repair Services. We 
were unable to construct usable samples for personal services, domestic household services, 
or cleaning and laundry services.13  
There are many methods for estimating the size of the shadow economy, as discussed at 
length in Schneider and Enste (2000) and Giles and Tedds (2002). We use data based on two 
                                                 
13 The best we could do from OECD sources, by combining all three types of activities, results in a sample of 
only seven countries with data on our preferred tax measure. Regressions for this sample show a negative 
relationship between taxes and the employment and value added shares, as predicted by the theory, but the 
results are not statistically significant. In a previous draft, we reported a statistically significant effect of personal 
taxes on the shares for this industry group. However, upon further review of the data, we deleted two countries 
from our original sample because of incompatible classifications, and we corrected the U.S. data. We have 
milder concerns about the consistency of the classification and measurement of these activities in the remaining 21  
quite different methods – the Currency Demand Method and the Electricity Method. To the 
best of our knowledge, these are the only methods that have been widely applied in a 
consistent manner to the countries in our samples. 
The Currency Demand Method has a long history that dates to Cagan (1958), but recent 
implementations follow Tanzi (1980). Under this method, the researcher specifies a time-
series regression model for the ratio of currency to bank deposits or overall money holdings. 
The regression model relates the currency demand ratio to interest rates, per capita income, 
tax rate measures and other variables. The difference between the predicted currency value at 
actual tax rates and the predicted value at zero tax rates (or to tax rates in a base year with, by 
assumption, no shadow economy) yields an estimate for the currency demand arising from tax 
evasion in the underground sector. Given an assumption about income velocity in the 
underground sector, typically that it equals income velocity in the legal market sector, one 
obtains an estimate of shadow economy size by multiplying the underground currency 
demand by the underground income velocity.        
Under the Electricity Method, the ratio of electricity usage to GDP in a base period is used 
to estimate shadow economy size in other periods. In practice, this method typically relies on 
two assumptions: unit elasticity of total output (measured plus unmeasured) with respect to 
electricity usage, and total output equal to measured output in the base period. The gap 
between the total output implied by the posited relationship to electricity usage and official 
GDP then provides an estimate of shadow economy size. Obviously, this method rests heavily 
on the posited relationship between total output and electricity usage. This relationship can be 
disturbed by changes in output composition, the relative price of electricity, and the 
technological requirements for electricity usage.    
                                                                                                                                                          
countries. For these reasons, we concluded that a sample for this industry group does not provide a sound basis 
for inference.    22  
For our purposes, the Electricity Method also suffers from a conceptual problem in that it 
fails to distinguish between household production and other production activity that takes 
place outside the legal market sector. For example, if personal taxes shift the preparation of 
meals from restaurants to home cooking, they also shift electricity usage from the market to 
household production sectors. This substitution response shows up as a larger shadow 
economy under the Electricity Method, but it is more appropriately characterized as a shift in 
favor of production for own use and away from markets altogether.   
  For country-level data on average personal tax rates, we rely on Nickell and Nunciata 
(2001) and Schneider (2002).  Roughly speaking, the data from Schneider measure average 
tax rates paid by the average worker, but major components of personal taxes for a typical 
worker – such as payroll taxes – are proportional to earnings. And most consumption taxes 
are proportional to expenditures.  Hence, we think that Schneider’s data capture much of the 
cross-country variation in marginal tax rates for the average worker. Schneider’s tax data are 
also better suited for our purposes in other respects, because they provide enough detail to 
construct the tax factor in (3) and (6), and because they do not mix taxes on capital income 
with taxes on labor income.  
  Schneider’s tax data lack a panel dimension and are available for fewer countries. Hence, 
we also consider data from Nickell and Nunciata, who measure the sum of average tax rates 
on payrolls, consumption expenditures and household income using data from national 
accounts. Their data run from 1960 to 1995 (with some missing observations), which enables 
us to characterize broad trends in the evolution of country-level personal tax rates. The Data 
Appendix provides a fuller description of the tax measures and other variables in our study. 
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by variable and sample. (See Table A2 in the Data 
Appendix for the composition of each sample.) There is much variation in both the outcome 
variables and the tax variables. Focusing on Sample D, the standard deviation across countries 23  
is 162 hours per adult for annual work time, 9.8 percentage points for the employment-
population ratio, and 5.1 percentage points for the shadow economy relative to GDP. Our 
broadest industry group accounts for 19.8 percent of employment and 14.0 percent of GDP, 
on average, with standard deviations of 3.1 and 3.6 percentage points, respectively. The 
standard deviation of the average personal tax rate is 11.3 percentage points in the Nickell-
Nunciata data and 12.8 points in the Schneider data.  
  As we proceed to the empirical relationship between tax rates and the outcome variables, 
it should be kept in mind that the data undoubtedly contain considerable noise. At a minimum, 
national differences in the measurement of the outcome variables lead to spurious variation in 
the data. However, there is no apparent reason why this source of measurement error in the 
outcome variables is correlated with the explanatory tax variables. Measurement error in the 
tax variables is a more serious concern, and it may well lead us to understate the impact of 
personal taxes on the outcome variables.  
 
6.  Cross-Country Evidence on the Effects of Personal Tax Rates 
A. Personal Tax Rates and their Evolution in Recent Decades 
Table 2 reports average personal tax rates (the sum of t, s and m) by country and decade. 
For each year, we measure the average personal tax rate as the sum of tax rates on payrolls, 
consumption expenditures and household incomes, as computed by Nickell and Nunciata. We 
then average over years within the decade to obtain the reported values.  
The table documents three key points. First, average personal tax rates vary greatly across 
countries, ranging from 31 percent in Japan to 77 percent in Sweden in the 1990s. Second, 
there has been a broad and pronounced upward drift in personal tax rates during recent 
decades, but the pace of drift slowed greatly or halted after 1985. The simple average of 
national tax rates rose by only 1.4 percent points from 1985 to 1990 and then fell slightly 24  
from 1990 to 1995. Third, the structure of relative tax rates has been fairly stable since the 
1970s, as seen by comparing the two rightmost columns in the table. The main outliers are 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, which experienced relative tax increases of 10 percentage points or 
more between the 1970s and 1990s, and the Netherlands, which experienced a relative tax 
decrease of 17 percentage points over the same time interval. No other country underwent a 
relative tax change of more than 6 percentage points between the 1970s and 1990s. 
In short, Table 2 establishes that average personal tax rates differ greatly among the 
countries under study and that these pronounced differences were largely intact for more than 
a decade prior to 1995. Moreover, the overall level of personal tax rates changed little after 
1985. Taken together, these observations imply that our data from the mid 1990s are 
reasonably well suited for an investigation into the long run effects of personal tax rates. 
B. Employment and Hours Response to Personal Tax Rates 
Empirical studies on the relationship between aggregate outcomes and personal tax rates 
typically use the sum of t, s and m, or something similar, as the explanatory tax variable. This 
sum equals the natural log of the tax factor up to a first-order approximation. We 
experimented with both the sum of tax rates and the tax factor as explanatory variables. The 
regression fit is typically as good or better for the sum of rates when the dependent variable is 
a measure of work hours, the employment rate or shadow economy size. In contrast, the tax 
factor usually yields a better fit when the dependent variable is an employment or value-added 
share. Hence, we focus on the tax factor variable for the share regressions and the sum of rates 
otherwise. 
Table 3 reports cross-country regressions of the employment rate and hours worked 
measures. Figure 1 displays the regression line and corresponding scatter plot of annual work 
hours per adult against the tax variable.  As seen in the table, the measure of the tax variable 
based on Schneider’s data yields better regression fits and larger tax effects. Partly for this 25  
reason, and partly because it is closer to the theoretical tax measure, our discussion in the text 
focuses on results for the Schneider-based measure when both tax sources are available.  
According to the Sample D results, a unit standard deviation tax difference of 12.8 
percentage points lowers annual work time in the market sector by (12.8 × 9.5 =) 122 hours 
per adult. This large effect amounts to three weeks of full time work per adult per year.  The 
effect of taxes operates on the intensive hours margin and the extensive employment margin. 
In particular, the estimates imply that a unit standard deviation tax difference reduces the 
employment-population ratio by 4.9 percentage points and work time per employed person by 
63 hours per year.   
For reasons explained above, we think the cross-sectional regressions in Table 3 provide a 
useful basis for inference about the long run effects of personal taxes, and a better basis than 
panel regressions that exploit high-frequency time variation within countries.14 Nevertheless, 
some readers may want to consider panel regressions of the outcome variables on average 
personal tax rates. Table 4 reports these panel regressions for available data, and Figure 2 
displays one of the corresponding scatter plots. Since the Schneider data pertain only to the 
mid 1990s, all of the panel regressions make use of the Nickell-Nunciata tax data. 
Standard errors are large in the panel specifications that isolate within-country time 
variation. This is unsurprising in light of the stable relative tax structure documented in Table 
2. The only panel regressions with country and year fixed effects that yield statistically 
significant coefficients on the tax variable are for the employment-population ratio. In these 
regressions, the estimated tax effects are about half as large as the ones in Table 3 using the 
Schneider data but larger than the ones using the Nickell-Nunciata data.  
The sign of the estimated tax effect on the employment-population ratio reverses when the 
panel specification omits fixed effects. Coupled with the results in Table 3, this reversal 26  
implies a positive cross-sectional relationship between personal tax rates and the employment-
population ratio in the earlier years of the sample period. Note that the pattern of results 
differs for the measures of hours worked. In fact, the negative relationship between tax rates 
and hours worked per employed person is much stronger when the regression specification 
omits fixed effects.   
C. Tax Effects on Industry-Level Employment and Value-Added Shares 
Table 5 reports cross-country regressions of the industry-level employment and value-
added shares on the tax variables, and Figures 3 and 4 display several of the scatter plots. The 
results in Panels A and B of Table 5 show a uniformly negative relationship between personal 
tax rates and the industry shares, as predicted by the theory in Section 3. Every regression 
shows a statistically significant effect at the 10 percent level, despite small sample sizes. 
The point estimates imply sizable tax effects on the industry mix of market activity. 
Consider an increase in the tax factor of 25 basis points, about one standard deviation. 
According to Table 5 (and using Table 1), this increase lowers the employment share in the 
broadest industry group by 2.4 percentage points, or 12 percent of industry employment 
evaluated at the mean. A 25 basis point rise in the tax factor lowers the employment share by 
1.4 points (31 percent) in Eating, Drinking and Lodging and by 0.7 points (9 percent) in Retail 
Trade and Repairs. Similarly, a 25 basis point rise lowers the value-added share by an 
estimated 1.9 points (13 percent) in the broad industry group, by .7 points (28 percent) in 
Eating, Drinking and Lodging and by 1.3 points (25 percent) in Retail Trade.  Specifications 
that are linear in the tax rates imply similar quantitative responses in the industry shares.  
As suggested by Figures 3 and 4, the industry share regressions are more fragile for value 
added than for employment. Figure 4.A, for example, reveals that Canada and the United 
States are large outliers in the value added regression for the broad industry group. Panel C of 
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Table 5 shows that the tax effect on the value added share for the broad industry group is 
smaller and statistically insignificant when we delete Canada and the United States from the 
sample. In contrast, the corresponding employment share regression is not sensitive to the 
exclusion of data for Canada and the United States.  
These results support the view that labor and consumption taxes twist the mix of market 
employment and production away from activities that are, according to the theory in Section 
3, relatively easy to carry out in the home (or underground) sector. It is possible, however, 
that higher tax rates lead to lower employment and value added shares in all industries that are 
not carried out or heavily subsidized by the public sector. It would remain useful to quantify 
the impact of tax rates on the mix of market production activity in this case, but the evidence 
would not then favor a theory that emphasizes differences among activities in the ease of 
substitution between market and home production. 
To investigate this issue, we now consider the relationship between tax rates and the share 
of total employment in manufacturing industries. According to the theory in Section 3, the 
manufacturing sector is relatively insensitive to personal tax rates, because manufacturing 
production is highly capital intensive, larger firms and establishments predominate, and the 
workforce is highly specialized.  Two other considerations motivate our choice of the 
manufacturing sector for this purpose. First, manufacturing accounts for a sizable fraction of 
total employment, essentially the same as Trade, Repairs, Eating, Drinking and Lodging 
combined in the average country. See Table 2. Second, the classification of manufacturing 
activities is well harmonized across countries, so that classification inconsistencies are 
unlikely to distort the results.  
Panel D in Table 5 reports the results of regressing manufacturing’s share of total 
employment on the tax rate measures. In sharp contrast to the results for the tax-responsive 
                                                                                                                                                          
tax rate changes are potentially quite useful as a basis for inference about long run tax effects. However, as Table 
3 shows, there is not much low-frequency country-specific variation in personal tax rates in our sample.    28  
service industries, the cross-country data show a positive, statistically insignificant effect of 
labor and consumption tax rates on manufacturing’s share of total employment. This evidence 
reinforces the view that personal taxes alter the industry mix of market activity by inducing a 
substitution toward home or underground production modes in activities characterized by low 
capital intensity, relatively unskilled and unspecialized labor inputs and less benefit from 
large-scale production teams. That is, taxes on consumption and labor have a much more 
powerful depressive effect on market employment and production in certain industries and 
activities rather than a uniform effect across industries and activities. 
Let us now return to the question of whether higher tax rates on consumption and labor 
income reduce the relative demand for less skilled workers. Table 6 reports industry-level 
statistics on hourly wages and years of schooling for selected industries, based on U.S. data. 
The table shows that labor inputs in Retail Trade, Repair Services, and in Eating, Drinking 
and Lodging establishments are much less skilled than labor inputs in the average industry, 
whether skill is measured by hourly wages or years of schooling. Taken together, Tables 5 
and 6 imply that personal taxes shift the industry mix of market activity away from sectors 
that intensively use less skilled workers. This evidence is consistent with the view that 
personal taxes twist the structure of labor demand in a way that concentrates negative effects 
on less skilled workers.  
D. Tax Effects on Shadow Economy Size 
Table 7 reports cross-country regressions of shadow economy measures on the sum of 
personal tax rates, and Figure 5 displays one of the corresponding scatter plots. Using the 
Currency Demand Method and Schneider’s tax data, a unit standard deviation increase in the 
average personal tax rate raises shadow economy size by (12.8 × .30=) 3.8 percent of 
measured GDP, which corresponds to a 24 percent increase in the size of the shadow 
economy evaluated at the mean. This is a large effect, and it implies that differences in the 29  
level of personal tax rates are a major determinant of differences in the extent of shadow 
economy activity among rich, industrialized countries. 
Recall that the shadow economy estimates based on the Currency Demand Method derive 
from fitted, country-specific time-series models of the form 
  $   (Currency-Deposits Ratio)    (Tax Rates) (Other Variables) ,
c c cc c
tt t φ ψ =+  (14) 
where c indexes countries, t indexes time, and a hat denotes an estimated parameter value. 
Given (14), the estimated size of the shadow economy is 
  () $ (Shadow)     Actual - Base Tax Rates
c c cc
tt t V φ   =    
 (15) 
where V is the income velocity in the underground sector, and the base tax rates are the values 
associated with no shadow economy. In practice, model specification, variable measurement, 
base tax rates, income velocity and sample period differ among countries.  
It is instructive, however, to consider the case with the same tax rate measures and the 
same values for base tax rates, velocity and the estimated tax-response parameter, $ φ .  In this 
case, cross-country regressions of the type reported in Table 7 and Figure 5 using the 
Currency Demand Method yield a perfect fit. More generally, the fit of such a regression 
informs us about the homogeneity in the values of V, $ φ  and the base tax rates that underlie the 
shadow economy estimates in (15). Such cross-country regressions do not provide any 
additional statistical evidence about the relationship between tax rates and shadow economy 
size – all of the evidence about tax effects on shadow economy size is contained in the 
underlying country-specific time-series regressions. Instead, the cross-country regression 
provides a convenient way to summarize the size (and similarity) of the estimated tax effects 
in the underlying time-series models.  
In contrast, the cross-country regressions based on the Electricity Method provide 
additional statistical evidence – over and above the evidence in the country-specific studies – 
about the impact of taxes on shadow economy size. Moreover, the evidence in Table 7 for the 30  
Electricity Method reflects cross-country variation rather than within-country time-series 
variation. That said, the cross-country evidence in Table 7 based on the Electricity Method is 
not particularly powerful. When using the Nickell-Nunciata tax measure, the estimated tax 
effect on shadow-economy size is small and statistically insignificant.  When using the 
Schneider tax measure, the estimated tax effect is positive and statistically significant at the 
10 percent level, but it is only half as large as the results for the Currency Demand Method.  
As remarked in Section 2, many previous studies find evidence that personal taxes boost 
the size of the shadow economy. In this regard, our main contribution is to clarify the 
interpretation of cross-country regressions of shadow economy size on taxes and to place the 
empirical relationship between taxes and shadow economy size into a larger context. In 
particular, our study indicates that the tax-induced stimulus to the shadow economy is part of 
a broader response pattern that includes important effects on market work hours, market 
employment and a systematic shift in the industry mix of market activity.  
E. Controls for Other Policies and Institutions that Affect Work Activity 
The regressions in Tables 3-5 and 7 do not control for minimum wage laws, job-security 
provisions or other policies and institutions that can discourage work activity in the legal 
market sector. If these omitted factors have important effects on the outcome variables, and if 
they are coincidentally correlated with the tax measures, then the previous regression results 
yield biased estimates of the total tax response. Of course, if higher personal taxes are 
causally related to the adoption of more or less burdensome policies and institutions, then the 
effects of these omitted factors can be viewed as part of the total response to taxes.  In this 
case, the identification issues raised by omitted policies and institutions are analogous to the 
ones discussed in Section 4 for distortionary government expenditures.  
We now consider controls for four types of policies and institutions that have attracted 
much attention in previous research.  31  
i.  Minimum wage laws can lower work activity in the legal market sector by raising 
labor costs for less skilled workers. Because legal wage minimums have greater bite in 
sectors that rely more heavily on less skilled workers, they can also alter the industry 
mix of market activity. To capture these potential effects, we use the ratio of a 
country’s legal wage minimum to its average wage. 
ii.  Collective bargaining institutions compress wage differentials (see Blau and Kahn, 
1999), which can lower work activity in the legal market sector by pricing certain 
workers out of the market. Davis and Henrekson (2003), among others, find that 
institutionally induced wage compression alters the industry mix of employment. To 
control for these effects, we use the percentage of a country’s workers who are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
iii.  Job security provisions can reduce work activity in the legal market sector by 
impeding the efficient allocation of labor, raising labor costs and discouraging new 
hires. Because job creation and destruction intensity is greater in lower wage 
industries,15 uniformly applied job security provisions are likely to alter the industry 
distribution of employment. To control for these potential effects, we use an OECD 
index of the overall strictness of a country’s employment protection legislation.  
iv.  Product market regulations that impede entry and hamper competition in output 
markets can also lower employment and alter the industry mix of market activity. To 
control for these effects, we use an index of competition-retarding product market 
regulations reported in Nicoletti and Pryor (2001). The index reflects a detailed 
codification of central government regulations in OECD countries. It is intended to 
capture state ownership and control of productive enterprises, barriers to 
entrepreneurship, ownership restrictions, and barriers to trade and investment. 
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Product market regulations can affect employment outcomes through several channels. 
Consider first our simple model of time allocation and task assignment. If barriers to 
competition result in a price-cost markup percentageµ , then the tax factor on the right side of 
equations (3) and (6) is scaled up by (1 ). µ +  That is, weaker competition in product markets 
displaces production activity from the legal market sector in the same way as higher personal 
taxes. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Gersbach and Schniewind (2002) show how 
barriers to product market competition lead to higher markups and lower employment in 
general equilibrium settings. In an interesting study of the French retail sector, Bertrand and 
Kramarz (2002), find that local entry barriers increase seller concentration, raise consumer 
prices, and lower employment. Their evidence suggests that entry barriers lower employment 
by raising markups and by curtailing market provision of labor-intensive customer services. 
In addition to these direct effects, the rents created by product market regulations help sustain 
political support for job-security provisions and stiffen resistance to labor market reforms, as 
stressed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).  
In considering controls for other policies and institutions, our main goal is to investigate 
whether and how the controls affect the estimated tax effects in the cross-country regressions. 
To that end, Table 8 reports regressions of annual hours per adult, shadow economy size and 
the industry-level shares on tax variables and controls. Each panel considers a particular 
control variable.  
The table conveys two main messages. First, with the partial exception of Panel B, the 
magnitude of the estimated tax effects is quite similar to our earlier results. Large standard 
errors prevent sharp inferences in some cases, especially with respect to shadow economy 
size, but the basic pattern of results survives the inclusion of the controls. Second, none of the 
control variables show a pattern of statistically significant tax effects on the outcome 
variables. This does not mean that the policies and institutions that motivate the control 33  
variables are unimportant; indeed, we are persuaded by previous research that these factors 
have powerful effects in some instances. Rather, Table 8 suggests that these other factors have 
less powerful, less pervasive effects than tax differences, or that the control variables suffer 
from more serious problems of measurement error.  
Several additional remarks in connection with Table 8 are in order.  First, while few of the 
slope estimates in Panel B are individually significant, the F-tests typically reject the 
hypothesis that taxes and collective bargaining are jointly insignificant. As in the other panels, 
the tax variable and the control jointly account for a large fraction of the outcome differences 
among countries. Second, unreported results for hours per worker and the employment-
population ratio are more sensitive to the inclusion of controls than the results for hours per 
adult. Third, the Table 8 regressions make use of tax rate data from Schneider (2002). When 
we substitute the Nickell-Nunciata tax variable, the results show almost no evidence of tax 
effects -- the tax variable is statistically significant at the ten percent level in only one of 32 
regressions. The measurement of tax variables appears to be a key issue for research into the 
role of taxes as a driving force behind national differences in work activity. 
We also examined regressions that include all four controls. None of the variables are 
individually significant in the annual hours regression that includes all of the controls, nor are 
the controls jointly significant. However, the controls and tax variable are jointly significant at 
the five percent level. None of the variables are individually or jointly significant in the 
shadow economy regression. In contrast, the industry regressions show negative effects (ten 
percent significance level) of bargaining coverage on employment and value added shares in 
the broad industry group; of product market regulations on employment shares in the broad 
industry group and in Eating, Drinking and Lodging; and of the tax factor on the employment 
share in Eating, Drinking and Lodging. 34  
To sum up, the tax and control variables are jointly significant in all of the regressions 
except those for the shadow economy measure. Taken together, the tax and control variables 
account for much of the cross-country variation in the outcome measures. The size and 
statistical significance of the estimated tax effects remain largely intact when we add a single 
control to the basic regression but not when we simultaneously include all four controls. On 
balance, the regression evidence supports the view that long run tax effects on work activity 
are large, and the view that tax rate differences among rich countries explain much of the 
international variation in work activity outcomes.  
 
7.  Other Evidence  
This section briefly describes other evidence about two issues: how personal taxes affect 
the amount of time devoted to household production activity, and the effects of personal taxes 
on the mix of market production activity. 
Piggott and Whalley (2001) analyze Canada’s 1990 switch from a 13.25 percent sales tax 
on manufactured goods, which offer little scope for production outside the legal market 
sector, to a broad-based consumption tax at a 7 percent rate. They report that the percentage 
of food dollars spent on restaurant meals fell from 42 percent prior to the Canadian tax reform 
to 35 percent afterwards. This change in the composition of consumption expenditures 
indicates that the Canadian VAT induced a large substitution away from the legal market 
provision of food preparation and dining services. Karoleff et al. (1994) and Spiro (1993) 
report a sizable increase in underground activity following Canada’s 1990 switch from a tax 
on manufactured goods to a broad-based consumption tax. 
Freeman and Schettkat (2002) investigate the large gap in female employment rates 
between high-tax Germany and the low-tax United States. They find that German women 
actually work as many hours as U.S. women after accounting for time devoted to household 
work. Housework activities like cleaning and cooking account for a major part of the extra 35  
time worked at home by German women. Freeman and Schettkat also find that expenditure 
shares on restaurant meals and personal services are much lower for German than for U.S. 
households. In a follow-up study, Schettkat (2003) finds that the entire gap in market work 
time between U.S. and German women can be explained by wage dispersion and tax wedges. 
Neither the level of real income nor culture (i.e., country-specific effects) turns out to have 
significant explanatory power. These U.S.-German differences in household work activity and 
the composition of consumption expenditures are consistent with our cross-country evidence, 
and they fit the implications of the theory in Section 3. 
In a similar vein, Olovsson (2004) claims that total work time, inclusive of home 
production activity, is only one percent lower in Sweden than in the United States, even 
though Swedes work ten percent fewer hours in the market sector. Olovsson’s claim reiterates 
Juster and Stafford’s (1991, p. 498) conclusion that “Swedish men, compared to U.S. men, 
have less market work time, more home production time, and less leisure time.” While more 
research is needed to settle the issue, the widely held view that Europeans enjoy more leisure 
than Americans may be a myth founded on an overly narrow conception of work activity and 
a lack of comprehensive, internationally comparable time-use data.   
Aguiar and Hurst (2004) provide evidence from a different direction on the scope for 
substitution between market provision and home production. As in other research on life-
cycle consumption behavior, they find that food expenditures fall by an average of 17% at 
retirement, an observation that is often interpreted as a departure from consumption 
smoothing over time.  But Aguiar and Hurst also show that food consumption, as measured by 
the nutritional content of food intakes and by the income elasticity of different foods and 
dining experiences, does not drop at retirement. They also find that the decline in food 
expenditures “is accompanied by a 53% increase in time spent in home production (shopping 
for and preparing food) by individuals during retirement.”  In other words, the drop in the 36  
opportunity cost of time at retirement precipitates a large shift from market provision to home 
production of food services. 
In another line of research, empirical studies find that tax evasion is relatively prevalent 
in retail trade, restaurants, and hotels (and, to a lesser extent, in taxi services and professional 
consulting). See Skolka (1985) and Giles (2000). This evidence is usually interpreted to mean 
that tax evasion is relatively easy in these sectors. Our theoretical analysis points to another 
interpretation – namely, that the costs of underground production activity in terms of foregone 
comparative and absolute advantages and capital idleness are relatively low in these sectors. 
Of course, these two explanations are not exclusive, and it seems likely that both the relative 
ease of tax evasion and the relatively modest efficiency consequences of underground activity 
play a role in the high incidence of tax evasion in these sectors. 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
Our study relies on the large size and persistent character of tax rate differences among 
rich countries to draw inferences about long run tax effects. In summary terms, the data tell 
this story: Higher tax rates on labor income and consumption expenditures lead to less work 
time in the market sector, more work time in the household sector, a bigger underground 
economy, and smaller value added and employment shares in industries that rely heavily on 
low wage, low skill labor inputs. 
The estimated tax effects are large for our preferred tax measures. In cross-country 
regressions for the mid 1990s, a unit standard deviation tax hike of 12.8 percentage points 
leads to 122 fewer hours of market work per adult per year, a 4.9 percentage point drop in the 
employment-population ratio, an increase in shadow economy size amounting to 3.8 percent 
of measured GDP, and 10-30 percent smaller value added and employment shares in Retail 
Trade and Repairs, in Eating, Drinking and Lodging, and in a broader category that includes 37  
Wholesale Trade and Motor Trade and Repair. This estimated tax-response pattern is broadly 
consistent with the simple theory of task assignment and time allocation sketched in Section 
3. The industry mix evidence fits the theoretical implication that personal taxes twist the 
demand for labor away from less skilled workers.  
All of the variables in this study are susceptible to considerable measurement error. The 
outcome variables are not measured in exactly the same way in each country, and the 
classification of service sector activities is not fully harmonized. The shadow economy 
variable is especially fraught with measurement problems, which may explain why the 
estimated tax effect on shadow economy size is often statistically insignificant. The Nickell-
Nunciata tax measure captures average tax rates, as calculated from national income accounts, 
while the Schneider data are probably closer to the marginal and average tax rate for a typical 
worker. None of our tax measures captures the heterogeneity of tax rates within countries.  
In view of the measurement problems, we are struck by the consistent pattern and large 
size of the estimated tax effects when using the Schneider data to measure the tax variables. 
Controls for minimum wages, collective bargaining coverage, stringency of job security 
provisions and the extent of competition-retarding product market regulations do not greatly 
alter the size or pattern of the estimated tax effects. In contrast, the estimated tax effects based 
on the Nickell-Nunciata data are smaller, the regression fits are poorer, and the results are 
more sensitive to the inclusion of controls. In fact, once we include controls for other policies 
and institutions, the Nickell-Nunciata data yield no statistical evidence of a separate tax effect 
on the outcome variables. This sensitivity to the measurement of the tax variable merits 
greater attention in future research.16  
                                                 
16 We recently became aware of a paper by Nickell (2003), which concludes that a 10 percentage point rise in 
personal tax rates lowers the employment-population ratio by about 2 percentage points. Nickell’s estimate is 
half as large as our preferred estimate based on the Schneider tax data, but it is somewhat larger than our 
estimates in Table 3 based on the Nickell-Nunciata data. This comparison reinforces the conclusion that the 
measurement of tax variables is a key issue for future empirical work on how taxes affect work activity. 38  
  We emphasize that our estimated tax effects are not pure labor supply responses. Theory 
and evidence suggest that personal taxes operate partly by twisting labor demand away from 
workers with relatively elastic labor supply. It follows that the aggregate labor supply 
response to a uniform tax hike is bigger than suggested by the simple cross-sectional mean 
elasticity of labor supply. As a separate point, countries with higher tax rates also have bigger 
expenditures on government programs that are likely to discourage labor supply. We do not 
isolate expenditure-side effects on work activity, but they are probably large. In their recent 
review, Krueger and Meyer (2002, pp. 2384-2385) conclude that labor supply elasticities with 
respect to benefits for unemployment insurance, worker compensation and disability 
insurance “are substantially higher than the labor supply elasticities typically found for men in 
studies of the effects of wages or taxes on hours of work … [and] are also larger than the 
consensus range of estimates of the labor supply elasticity for women.” 
  Lastly, let us return to the recent studies by Prescott (2002, 2003), which consider the 
output, employment and welfare consequences of personal taxes in an equilibrium model with 
one production sector and a simple labor-leisure choice for the representative household. Our 
evidence supports the view that tax rate differences among rich countries are a major reason 
for large international differences in market work time.  In this respect, our results are very 
much in line with Prescott’s analysis. At the same time, however, our evidence strongly 
suggests that labor and consumption taxes operate with powerful effect on several margins: 
substitution between legal and underground activity, substitution between home and market 
production, the mix of market production activity, and the composition of market 
expenditures. Prescott’s model collapses these response margins to a single choice between 
work and leisure. It remains to be seen whether a model that accommodates several active 
response margins will sustain Prescott’s conclusion that European-level tax rates on labor 
income and consumption cause giant welfare losses.  39  
  Two features of Prescott’s model contribute to big tax effects on market work activity. 
First, he adopts logarithmic preferences over consumption and leisure, which implies high 
labor supply elasticity. Second, a large portion of government revenues are redistributed to 
households via lump-sum transfers, which partly negates the income effect of taxes on labor 
supply. Interpreted literally, the high labor supply elasticity is difficult to square with micro 
evidence, but one might interpret the preference specification as an approximate reduced form 
in which the high labor supply elasticity stands in for substitution possibilities between 
market and home (or underground) production sectors. The lump-sum redistribution of tax 
revenues helps to capture the negative effects of certain government expenditures on market 
work activity.  
  It would be useful to explicitly integrate non-market production and expenditure-side 
inventive effects on labor supply into macroeconomic models of taxes and work activity. 
Olovsson (2004) takes a step in that direction with respect to non-market production activity. 
He considers an equilibrium model with two consumption goods and two production sectors. 
One good is produced only in the market sector, and the second good is produced in both 
market and household sectors. There is imperfect substitution in consumption between the 
home-produced and market-produced variants of the second good. In this setup, Olovsson 
shows that U.S.-European tax rate differences can lead to large differences in market work 
time (and little difference in total work time) with a small Frisch elasticity of labor supply. He 
also shows that the market output losses generated by observed tax differences are large.  
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Data Appendix  
A. Tax Measures 
We obtain data on tax rates from two sources that differ in coverage, sample period and 
method of calculation. Table 10 in Schneider (2002) reports (a) the value added tax rate 
(average sales tax rate in the United States), (b) the direct tax rate on labor income, (c) the 
social security contribution rate of employees and (d) the social security contribution rate of 
employers. The notes to his table define (b) as the sum of all income taxes paid on wages and 
salaries (including income of the self employed), divided by “gross labor costs of an average 
income earner in the country.” The notes also state that (c) and (d) are “calculated on the basis 
of the annual gross earnings of an average income earner.” The source for the data, covering 
16 countries in 1996, are Schneider’s “own calculations and OECD working paper 176.” In 
calculating the tax factor on the right side of equations (3) and (6) in the main text, we use (a) 
to measure m, the sum of (b) and (c) to measure t, and (d) to measure s.  
There are at least three issues with respect to Schneider’s tax data. First, the meaning of 
“gross labor costs” and “annual gross earnings” is unclear. Our tax factor calculations 
interpret both terms as synonymous with workers’ pre-tax earnings.  
  Second, the U.S. figure of 13.8% for the employer social security contribution rate in 
column (5) of Schneider’s Table 10 appears to be too high. Mandatory employer contributions 
in the United States consist mainly of payments for the federal Old-Age, Survivors and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) programs, the federal 
and state unemployment insurance system, and state worker compensation programs. As of 
1996, the OASDI rate was 6.2% on the first $62,700 in earnings, and the HI rate was 1.45% 
on all earnings. The federal unemployment insurance tax rate was 0.8% on the first $7,000 of 
a worker’s annual earnings, zero at the margin for most workers, and less than 0.3% of 
covered wages (U.S. House of Representatives, 2000, pages 305-306). The average state 45  
unemployment insurance tax rate in 1995 was 2.2% of taxable wages and 0.8% of total wages 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 1996, Table 5.10). Employer costs for worker compensation 
programs averaged 1.66% of covered wages in 1996 (Williams et al., 2003, Figure 1). Using 
the 0.8% and 2.2% figures for unemployment insurance taxes, U.S. payroll tax rates sum to 
12.3%, which is 1.6 percentage points lower than Schneider’s figure. Our discussion also 
implies that average marginal payroll tax rates in the United States are much less than 12.3%.  
Third, the notes to Schneider’s Table 10 indicate that payroll and manpower taxes are 
counted as part of direct taxes on labor income. From this description, it sounds as if certain 
payroll taxes are counted in both columns (3) and (5) of his Table 10, but this interpretation 
appears incorrect in light of the fact that Schneider includes columns (3) and (5) in calculating 
the total tax and social security burden. On this basis, we treat his columns (3) and (5) as 
measuring different aspects of the tax system.  
  Nickell and Nunciata (2001) report the average tax rate on payrolls, household income 
and consumption expenditures. They measure tax rates using the London School of 
Economics CEP-OECD database, which draws on the OECD National Accounts and other 
sources. Their “tax wedge” measure is the sum of three components: An “employment tax 
rate”,  
Employer contributions to social security, welfare plans and private pensions
,
Total employee compensation, in cash or in kind, less the numerator
 
 a “direct tax rate” on household income, 
 
Employee contributions to social security + household income taxes
,
Current receipts of households
 
and an “indirect tax rate” on household consumption, 
 
Indirect taxes less subsidies
.
Private final consumption expenditures
 
The employment tax rate corresponds to the variable s in the tax factor formula, except 
that it includes employer contributions to private pensions as part of the tax on payrolls. The 46  
direct tax rate corresponds imperfectly to the variable t in the tax factor formula in that it 
includes taxes on all household income. Likewise, the base in this tax rate measure includes 
all household income.17  The indirect tax rate corresponds to the variable s in the tax factor 
formula. Nickell and Nunciata report the sum of these three tax rates as the “tax wedge,” 
which we use as a measure of the average personal tax rate. 
Nickell and Nunciata report annual data on 20 OECD countries for varying sample 
periods over the time period from 1960 to 1995. For Australia, we impute the 1985 value to 
1990 and 1995 (Samples A and C). For New Zealand, we impute the 1986 value to 1995 
(Sample C). 
B. National Employment, Population and Work Hours 
Our data on the employment-population ratio and hours worked in the market sector are 
drawn or derived from the following OECD sources: 
•   OECD Employment Outlook, 1998 and 2002, Statistical Annex. 
•   Online source at 
www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/viewbase.asp?DBNAME=lfs_data.  
Sample A contains data on annual hours per employed person, annual work hours per 
adult and the ratio of employment to working-age population (15-64 years old) for 13 
countries in 1977, 1983, 1990 and 1995. We impute hours worked for Belgium and Ireland in 
1977 based on their 1983 values. Sample B contains data on the employment-population ratio 
from 1977 to 1994. The remaining samples contain data for 1995. 
C. Size of Shadow Economy 
Unless noted otherwise, our data on shadow economy size as a percent of GDP are from 
the column headed “Average 1994/95” in Table 3 of Schneider (2002). These estimates of 
shadow economy size are based on the Currency Demand Method, except for New Zealand 
                                                 
17 We are uncertain about the precise meaning of “current receipts of households” and “household income 47  
which is an average of values based on the Currency Demand and MIMIC Methods. Our data 
on shadow economy size for 1996 are drawn from Schneider’s Table 10. Our data on shadow 
economy size in 1990 based on the Electricity Method are drawn from Table 6 in Schneider 
and Enste (2000).  We use observations on shadow economy size in Great Britain for the 
United Kingdom.    
D. Industry Value-Added and Employment Shares 
For data on value-added and employment by industry group, we rely mainly on the 2000 
and 2001 editions of the OECD report, Services: Statistics on Value Added and Employment. 
The coverage of these data includes “non-market services” produced by the government and 
non-profit institutions and provided free of charge or at a fee well below production costs. We 
use data on value added at current prices and data on total employment, which includes 
“working proprietors and unpaid family workers of unincorporated units as well as 
employees.” There are differences among countries in the methods used to measure value 
added and employment. 
Many countries do not report service sector data that are sufficiently disaggregated for 
our purposes. In addition, even for the broad industry groups we consider, there are 
inconsistencies among reporting countries in the classification of certain service sector 
activities such as trade in motor vehicles, repair services, and eating and drinking 
establishments. Classification inconsistencies led us to suppress the Canadian data for Retail 
Trade and Repairs. In addition, we suppressed the Spanish data because they are highly 
implausible. For example, the reported Spanish figures imply that “Restaurants and hotels” is 
two-thirds larger than “Retail trade and repairs” based on value added data, in sharp contrast 
to other countries, but one-third smaller based on employment data. For the United Kingdom, 
we used data on number of employees, because industry-level employment data are not 
                                                                                                                                                          
taxes,” the terms that Nickell and Nunciata use in describing the construction of their “direct tax rate” measure. 48  
reported. For the United States, classification inconsistencies led us to construct our own 
figures for value added and employment in Retail Trade and Repairs and in Eating, Drinking 
and Lodging. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
For data on the share of employment accounted for by manufacturing industries, we rely 
on the 2003 edition of OECD Labour Force Statistics, 1982-2002.  For France, we used data 
on the number of manufacturing employees, because French manufacturing employment is 
not reported. This leads to a slight understatement of the French manufacturing share. 
Table A1 reports our country-level data on value added and employment shares. Table 
A2 shows the composition of each sample used in our study. 
Table A1.  Data on Industry-Level Employment and Value-Added Shares, 1995 




































Austria 20.44 6.00 7.30  20.83  15.84 3.69 4.48 
Belgium  16.50 2.83   18.69  12.81 1.51  
Canada  23.88 6.26   13.92  11.77 2.29 4.79 
Denmark  18.55 2.84 7.02  20.32  13.28 1.57 3.85 
France 16.13 3.08 6.66  17.95  12.17 2.40 4.27 
Germany  19.13 3.77 8.72  24.12  11.24 1.22 3.92 
Ireland 20.65 5.44   18.82  10.94 2.35  
Italy  20.33 5.07 8.84  21.79  16.16 3.14 6.02 
Netherlands  19.38 2.97 7.56  19.13  14.01 1.74 3.89 
Norway  16.87 2.54   17.02  11.36 1.22  
Sweden  15.35 2.61   18.61  10.83 1.22  
Switzerland 22.19  5.68  8.96  22.99  18.82  3.0  7.85 
United 
Kingdom 
22.27 5.48 9.87  21.91  12.97 2.58 4.50 
United 
States 
25.94 7.72 9.11  17.99  23.59 5.14 7.76 
 
Note: Column (1) covers everything in columns (2) and (3) plus wholesale and commission 
trade, trade in motor vehicles, and motor vehicle repair services. Column (3) excludes motor 
vehicle repair services but includes other consumer repair services. Column (3) does not 
include eating and drinking establishments.  
 
Sources: OECD (2000, 2001, 2003) and authors’ calculations, as described in the Data 
Appendix. 49  
Table A2.  Sample Compositions for Country-Level Data 
 
 Sample 
Country  A B  C  D  E  F 
Australia X    X       
Austria         X  X 
Belgium  X  X  X X X  
Canada  X  X  X X X  
Denmark    X  X X X X 
Finland X  X  X       
France  X  X  X X X X 
Germany    X  X X X X 
Ireland  X  X  X X X  
Italy  X  X  X X X X 
Japan  X  X  X   X  
Netherlands    X  X X X X 
New Zealand      X       
Norway  X  X  X X X  
Portugal   X  X       
Spain X  X  X  X     
Sweden  X  X  X X X  
Switzerland    X  X X X X 
Unit.  Kingdom  X  X  X X X X 
United  States X  X  X X X X 
          
# of Countries  13  17  19  14  14  9 




1995 1995 1995 1995 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Data 
 
 Sample 
Variable  A B  C D  E F 





























Shadow Economy, % GDP, 
Currency Demand Method 





Shadow Economy, % GDP, 
Electricity Method, 1990 
     14.7 
(4.4) 
  
Value Added Share: Trade, 
Repairs, Eating, Drinking, 
Lodging 
     14.0 
(3.6) 
 
Value Added Share: 
Eating, Drinking, Lodging 
     2.4 
(1.1) 
 
Value Added Share:  
Retail Trade and Repairs 
      5.2 
(1.6) 
Employment Share: Trade, 
Repairs, Eating, Drinking, 
Lodging  
     19.8 
(3.1) 
 
Employment Share:  
Eating, Drinking, Lodging 
     4.4 
(1.7) 
 
Employment Share:  
Retail Trade and Repairs 
      8.2 
(1.1) 
Emloyment Share: All 
Manufacturing Industries 
     19.6 
(2.6) 
 
Sum of Tax Rates from  













Sum of Tax Rates from 
Schneider (2002) 






Tax Factor, Based on Data 
from Schneider (2002) 






         
#  of  Countries  13  17 19 14 14 9 




1995 1995 1995 1995 
#  of  Observations  52  306  19 14 14 9 
 
Notes: 
1.  Aside from the bottom three rows, the table entries report means (standard 
deviations) for the indicated variables and samples. For Samples A and B, the 
value in parentheses reports the standard deviation after sweeping out year and 
country fixed effects. See Table A2 in the appendix for sample compositions. 51  
2.  Annual work hours per adult equals the ratio of employment to working-age 
population (15 to 64 years old) times the average annual hours of market work by 
employed persons. 
3.  Sum of Tax Rates is the sum of average tax rates on income, payrolls, and 
consumption expenditures. The Tax Factor equals the product of (1 + payroll tax 
rate) and (1 + consumption tax rate) divided by (1 – income tax rate). See the text 
for an explanation and derivation of this tax variable. Income equals labor income 
in the data from Schneider and household income in the data from Nickell and 
Nunciata. The tax rate data from Schneider are for 1996.  
4.  See the Data Appendix for additional information about the data and sources. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2.  Average Personal Tax Rates by Country and Decade 
 
Country  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-95 Deviation from 
Mean in 1970s 
Deviation from
Mean in 1990s 
Australia 29    35  39  .  -10  -11 
Austria  49 55 59 59  11  9 
Belgium  41 44 46 50  -1  -1 
Canada  34 42 43 51  -3  0 
Denmark  37 53 60 59  9  9 
Finland  41 54 60 64  9  13 
France  56 59 65 67  15  17 
Germany  43 47 50 53  3  2 
Ireland  26 32 38 40  -13  -10 
Italy  57 55 57 68  10  18 
Japan    24 26 34 31  -18  -19 
Netherlands  50 56 55 45  12  -5 
New  Zealand .  29 31 .  -15  -19 
Norway  49 60 65 60  16  10 
Portugal .  26  35  40  -19  -10 
Spain  22 28 41 47  -16  -4 
Sweden  47 65 78 77  21  26 
Switzerland 30  324  36  35  -10  -15 
United  Kingdom  38 45 51 47  1  -4 
United  States 35 42 44 45  -3  -5 
Simple Mean  38 44.2  49.3  50.3    
 
The 5-year changes in the simple mean of the average personal tax rates for the countries 
listed in the table are as follows: 
Interval  1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 
          Change  3.0  5.3  1.4  3.2  3.0  1.4  -.4 
  
Notes:  
1.  Table entries report the sum of average tax rates on labor income, payrolls and 
consumption expenditures using data from Nickell and Nunciata (2001). 
2.  Before computing the average value over countries in each decade and the country-
specific deviations, we fill in missing values using the nearest available observation 
for the same country. 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Nickell and Nunciata (2001). 
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Table 3. Cross-Country Regressions of Work Hours and Employment Rates 
on Tax Rates, 1995 Data 
 




















2 R  
Annual Work Hours  
Per Adult 
A    Nickell & 
Nunciata 
-6.7 3.3  .07  .21 
Annual Work Hours  
Per Adult 
C   Nickell & 
Nunciata 
-7.4 2.6  .01  .27 
Annual Work Hours  
Per Adult 
D Nickell  & 
Nunciata  
-4.1 4.0  .32  .01 
Annual Work Hours  
Per Adult 
D   Schneider -9.5  2.4  .00  .52 
            
Annual Hours Per 
Employed Adult 
A   Nickell & 
Nunciata 
-6.5 2.1  .01  .42 
Annual Hours Per 
Employed Adult 
C   Nickell & 
Nunciata 
-6.5 2.6  .02  .23 
Annual Hours Per 
Employed Adult 
D Nickell  & 
Nunciata 
-3.9 3.4  .28  .02 
Annual Hours Per 
Employed Adult 
D   Schneider -4.9  2.9  .11  .13 
            
100 ×Employment-
Population Ratio 
A   Nickell & 
Nunciata 
-.12 .19  .54  -.05 
100 ×Employment-
Population Ratio 
C Nickell  & 
Nunciata 
-.17 .15  .29  .01 
100 ×Employment-
Population Ratio 
D Nickell  & 
Nunciata 
-.07 .25  .77  -.08 
100 ×Employment-
Population Ratio 
D Schneider -.38  .19 .07 .19 
 
   
Notes:  
1.  All regressions are by ordinary least squares. 
2.  The “P-Value” reports the marginal significance level in a test of the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient on the tax variable equals zero.   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4.  Panel Regressions of Work Hours and Employment Rates on Tax Rates 
 



















2 R  
Annual Work Hours  
Per Adult 
A 77,  83 
90, 95 
No No  -3.1  1.7  .07  .04 
Annual Work Hours
 Per Adult 
A 77,  83 
90, 95 
Yes Yes  -4.3  3.0  .16 .83 
(.03) 
                
Annual Hours Per  
Employed Adult 
A 77,  83 
90, 95 
No No  -9.1  1.0  .00  .61 
Annual Hours Per 
Employed Adult 
A 77,  83 
90, 95 
Yes Yes  -2.2  1.9  .25 .89 
(.01) 
                
100 ×Employment-
Population Ratio 
A 77,  83 
90, 95 
No No  .17  .08  .05  .05 
100 ×Employment-
Population Ratio 
A 77,  83 
90, 95 















1.  All regressions are by ordinary least squares, with and without fixed effects, as 
indicated.  
2.  The tax rate variable is from Nickell and Nunciata (2001). 
3.  The rightmost column reports in parentheses the adjusted
2 R value after sweeping out 
the fixed effects. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5: Cross-Country Regressions of Industry Shares on Tax Measures 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Employment or Value Added in the Industry Group 
 














2 R  
Trade, Repairs, Eating, 
Drinking, Lodging 
E Sum  of 
Rates 
-.198 .038  .00  .67 




-9.6 2.5  .00  .52 
Eating, Drinking and 
Lodging 




.026 .00  .49 




-5.4 1.3  .00  .55 
Retail Trade and Repairs  F  Sum of 
Rates 
-.055 .025  .07  .32 
Retail Trade and Repairs  F  Tax 
Factor 
-2.8 1.2  .06  .34 
 














2 R  
Trade, Repairs, Eating, 
Drinking, Lodging 
E Sum  of 
Rates 
-.142 .069  .06  .20 




-7.4 3.8  .07  .18 
Eating, Drinking and 
Lodging 
E Sum  of 
Rates 
-.044 .021  .06  .20 




-2.7 1.1  .03  .29 
Retail Trade and Repairs  F  Sum of 
Rates 
-.100 .029  .01  .57 
Retail Trade and Repairs  F  Tax 
Factor 
-5.3 1.3  .00  .67 
 
C. Value Added Share Regressions, Excluding Canada and the United States in Sample E 
 
Industry Group 







2 R  
Sum of Rates  -.103  .066  .15  .12  Trade, Repairs, Eating, Drinking, 
Lodging  Tax Factor  -4.8  3.5  .20  .08 
 
D. Manufacturing Employment Shares Regressed on Tax Measures in Sample E 
 
Industry Group 







2 R  
Sum of Rates  .027  .058  .66  -.07  All Manufacturing Industries 
Tax Factor  1.7  3.2  .59  -.06 
Note: Tax rate measures calculated from data in Schneider (2002). See, also, notes to Table 3. 
Source: Authors’ calculations and statutory tax rates. 56  
 





(1) Mean Hourly 
Wage, Log Deviation 




(3) Mean Years 
 of Schooling, 
Deviation from 
Average 
(4) Years of 
Schooling  
Rank 
Wholesale Trade  4  28  .03  28 
Retail Trade  -28  51  -.38  38 
Automotive and 
Miscellaneous Repair 
Services   
-19 49  -1.15  52 
Hotels and Lodging 
Establishments 
-36 53  -.94  47 
Eating and Drinking 
Establishments 
-51 60  -1.16  54 
        
Range  108 log points  1 to 61  4.9 years  1 to 61 
Between-Industry 
Standard Deviation 




1.  We calculated the industry-level wage and schooling statistics from individual-level 
data in the 1985-1987 March files of the U.S. Current Population Survey. See Davis 
and Henrekson (2003) for details. 
2.  Column (1) reports the difference between the hours-weighted mean of the log hourly 
wage in the indicated industry and the average over industries of the log hourly wage. 
There are 61 industries that cover the entire economy. Column (3) reports the 
difference between the hours-weighted mean years of schooling in the indicated 
industry and the average over industries of mean schooling years. Years of schooling 
is based on the highest grade completed. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7.  Cross-Country Regressions of Shadow Economy Size on Tax Rates 
 
Dependent Variable: Shadow Economy as a Percentage of Official GDP 































.25 .11  .04 .26 
Schneider D  Currency 
Demand 
.30 .08  .00 .53 
Schneider D  Currency 
Demand (1996) 




Method  (1990) 
-.04 .11  .75  -.07 
Schneider D  Electricity 
Method (1990) 




1.  Data on the size of the shadow economy are averages of 1994 and 1995 values unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2.  For the shadow economy size measure based on the Electricity Method, the results are 
nearly identical whether we use the Nickell-Nunciata tax measure for 1990 or 1995. 
3.  As explained in the text, the regressions that rely on the Currency Demand Method 
have a different interpretation than the ones that rely on the Electricity Method.  
See, also, notes to Table 3.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 8.  Cross-Country Regressions with Controls for other Policies and Institutions   
 
A.  Control Variable: Ratio of Minimum to Average Wages in 1991-1994 
    Tax Variable  Ratio of Minimum 




2 R  
Dependent Variable  Sample  Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E.     
Work Hours Per Adult  D  -9.5  2.9  .08  3.4  .01  .48 
Shadow Economy Size   D  .19  .10  -.08  .12  .21  .11 
Broad Emp. Share  E  -8.2  3.0  -.06  .07  .01  .51 
Broad VA Share  E  -9.0  4.8  .07  .11  .19  .13 
Emp. Share in Eating, 
Drinking, Lodging 
E -5.3  1.7  -.00  .04  .01 .51 
VA Share in Eating, 
Drinking Lodging  
E -3.0  1.4  .01  .03  .09 .23 
Emp. Share in Retail  F  -2.9  1.6  .00  .04  .19  .23 
VA Share in Retail  F  -6.6  1.3  .06  .03  .01  .75 
 
 
B. Control Variable: Percentage of Workers Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
1994 (earlier for some countries) 
    Tax Variable  Collective Bar-




2 R  
Dependent Variable  Sample  Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E.     
Work Hours Per Adult  D  -9.3  5.1  -.10  2.6  .01  .48 
Shadow Economy Size   D  .17  .18  -.00  .10  .26  .07 
Broad Emp. Share  E  -2.8  3.9  -.08  .04  .00  .63 
Broad VA Share  E  -0.2  6.6  -.08  .06  .09  .24 
Emp. Share in Eating, 
Drinking, Lodging 
E -4.4  2.5  -.01  .02  .01 .52 
VA Share in Eating, 
Drinking Lodging  
E -1.8  2.0  -.01  .02  .09 .24 
Emp. Share in Retail  F  -0.7  2.1  -.02  .02  .11  .37 
VA Share in Retail  F  -4.4  2.4  -.01  .02  .02  .63 
 
 
C. Control Variable: OECD Index of Employment Protection Legislation in the late 1990s 





2 R  
Dependent Variable  Sample  Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E.     
Work Hours Per Adult  D  -5.8  3.0  -80.8  44.4  .00  .60 
Shadow Economy Size   D  .13  .12  0.7  1.8  .24  .09 
Broad Emp. Share  E  -7.7  3.0  -0.9  0.9  .01  .53 
Broad VA Share  E  -7.8  4.9  0.2  1.4  .22  .10 
Emp. Share in Eating, 
Drinking, Lodging 
E -4.9  1.7  -0.3  0.5  .01 .52 
VA Share in Eating, 
Drinking Lodging  
E -2.5  1.4  -0.1  0.4  .10 .23 
Emp. Share in Retail  F  -3.3  1.5  0.3  0.5  .15  .29 
VA Share in Retail  F  -6.2  1.5  0.5  0.4  .01  .68 59  
D. Control Variable: Index of Competition-Retarding Product Market Regulations, 1997-98 
    Tax Variable  Index of Product 




2 R  
Dependent Variable  Sample  Coeff. S.E. Coeff.  S.E.     
Work Hours Per Adult  D  -8.4  2.5  -140  102  .01  .55 
Shadow Economy Size   D  .18  .10  -2.2  4.3  .23  .09 
Broad Emp. Share  E  -8.8  2.2  -3.8  1.8  .00  .63 
Broad VA Share  E  -7.5  4.0  0.4  3.3  .22  .10 
Emp. Share in Eating, 
Drinking, Lodging 
E -5.0  1.2  -1.8  1.0  .00  .61 
VA Share in Eating, 
Drinking Lodging  
E -2.6  1.2  -0.5  0.9  .09  .24 
Emp. Share in Retail  F  -2.6  1.2  -1.1  1.1  .12  .35 
VA Share in Retail  F  -5.6  1.2  1.6  1.0  .01  .73 
 
Notes:  
1.  All regressions by OLS. For regressions with annual work hours per adult or shadow 
economy size as the dependent variable, the tax variable is the sum of tax rates on 
payrolls, labor incomes and consumption expenditures. The share regressions use the 
tax factor. Both tax variables are based on data from Schneider (2002). The measure 
of shadow economy size is based on the Electricity Method. 
2.  Means (standard deviations) for the control variables in Sample D: ratio of minimum 
to average wages, 51 (11); percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements, 72 (25); index of employment protection, 1.95 (.87); index of product 
market regulations, .58 (.29). See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of all other 
variables. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. Minimum wage variable: Nickell and Layard (1999, Table 
9) and Dolado et al. (1996, Table 1). Bargaining coverage: Blau and Kahn (1999, Table 
2); value for Ireland set to the mean in the top third of the coverage values in Blau and 
Kahn based on description in Glyn (2002, page 6). Index of employment protection 
legislation: summary indicator of “Overall EPL Strictness, Version 2”, as reported in 
OECD (1999, Table 2.5). Index of product market regulations: “Total Product Market, O-
NSB Scores”, as reported in Table 1 of Nicoletti and Pryor (2001).   1  
 
Figure 1: Tax Rates and Annual Work Hours Per Adult
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Labor + Payroll + Consumption Tax Rate
Hours
Tax Data from Schneider (2002)
Hours = 1655 - 9.5*(Sum of Tax Rates)
              (2.4)
 2  
Figure 2: Tax Rates and Annual Hours Per Employed Person
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Labor + Payroll + Consumption Tax Rate
Hours
Tax Data from Nickell and Nunciata (2001)
Hours = 2230 - 9.1*(Sum of Tax Rates)
              (1.0)
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1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Percent
Percent of Employment = 38.3 - 9.6(Tax Factor)
                   (2.5)














1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Percent
        Percent of Employment = 13.6 - 2.8(Tax Factor)
                           (1.2)
















1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Tax Factor
Percent
Percent of Employment = 14.8 - 5.4(Tax Factor)
                   (1.3)
Figure 3: Personal Taxes and Industry Employment Shares, 19952  
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Tax Factor
Percent
Percent of Value Added = 7.6 - 2.7(Tax Factor)
                   (1.1)

















1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Percent
Percent of Value Added = 28.3 - 7.4(Tax Factor)
                    (3.8)













1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3
Percent
Percent of Value Added = 15.4 - 5.3(Tax Factor)
                    (1.3)
Figure 4: Personal Taxes and Value Added Shares, 19951  
Figure 5: Tax Rates and Shadow Economy as Percent of GDP
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Tax Data from Schneider (2002)
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